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MARQUE7 TE LAW REVIEW
Invitee or Licensee: Classification of Person Invited onto Pri-
vate Premises: In Schlicht v. Thesing, the court held that the fact that
plaintiff was performing babysitting services at the request of the
defendants was sufficient to establish her as their invitee, and not a
mere social guest who would be a licensee. Plaintiff was the mother of
defendant and had come to the defendant's home to babysit with her
grandchildren so that defendant could be hospitalized for the delivery
of an expected baby. Plaintiff was injured when she fell down the
basement stairs after entering a doorway which she mistakenly believed
to be another bedroom but which actually was a newly-located base-
ment stairway. The court deemed immaterial the fact that the plain-
tiff's services were gratuitous.
This decision supports the recent case of Smith v. Shuda,2 where
plaintiff, a married daughter, was helping her mother, the defendant,
paint a kitchen in defendant's home' at the defendant's request. The
court approved an instruction which stated the defendant's obligation
to the plaintiff to be that of an invitor. In neither of these cases did
the plaintiff come within the definition of a "business visitor" as set
forth in the Restatement of Torts,3 a condition necessary under this
statement of the law to constitute the plaintiff an invitee.
The distinction between an invitee and a licensee is important be-
cause the standard of care owed to an invitee is greater than that owed
to a mere licensee. The standard of care for the protection of an in-
vitee includes a duty to warn of latent dangers of which the invitor
knows, and imposes on the invitor the further duty to inspect the
premises to discover possible dangerous conditions of which the in-
vitor does not know.4 In comparison, the licensee has no right to de-
mand that the land be made safe for his reception, and the licensor
has no obligation to inspect the premises to discover dangers which are
unknown to the licensor, or to give warning or protection against con-
ditions which are known or should be obvious to the licensee.5
For purposes of determining the status of a person on the premises
of another, there are two principal theories which have received recog-
nition. The Restatement of Torts6 sets forth the "economic benefit"
theory, which imposes the duty of affirmative care on the invitor as
the price he must pay for the economic benefit he derives, or expects
to derive, from the presence of the visitor.7 In the alternative, there
is the "invitation" theory, so-called because of its emphasis on the aspect
125 Wis. 2d 436, 130 N.W. 2d 763 (1964).
222 Wis. 2d 629, 126 N.W. 2d 498 (1964).
3 RE TATEMENT, TORTS §332 (1934).
4 Prosser, Law of Torts 402 (3d. Ed., 1964).
5 Id. at page 385.
6 Ibid. note 3 and §343 comment "a."
7 Ibid. note 4 at page 396.
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of invitation. The basis of liability is the representation to be implied
from the encouragement of the invitation." Professor Prosser con-
siders this idea sound.9
Returning to the principal case of Schlicht v. Thesing,10 we observe
that the predication to the class of invitee of Mrs. Schlicht employes
aspects of both theories. The benefit adheres in the providing of the
babysitting service, the invitation in the request that the service be per-
formed. There is no indication that either is subordinate to the other
or less essential; they are merely both present, and in combination they
constitute the plaintiff an invitee. However, because the services were
gratuitous there was no business relationship, and the benefit, as pre-
viously stated, was not of the type contemplated by the "economic
benefit" theory.
In Lucas v. Barner," exactly in point with the Schlicht Case,'
the court applied the "economic benefit" theory and held the plaintiff
to be a licensee. This was an action against a daughter and son-in-law
for injuries sustained when plaintiff, while caring for her grandsons
in the defendant's home and at the request of the defendants, slipped
on a loose carpet of which she was unaware and of which she had not
been warned. The lower court entered judgment for plaintiff on the
theory that she was a business invitee. The review court held that plain-
tiff was, instead, a mere licensee, there being no evidence that the
parties contemplated entering into a contract or commercial relationship
which would rebut the presumption that the service was gratuitous.
The presumption of gratuity was raised by the fact that the plaintiff
was the mother of the defendant; the court stating: "(T)he service
rendered by the respondent mother was as a member of a family en-
joying a normal relationship."13 Where the service was gratuitous,
the status of respondent was that of licensee. This result would pre-
sumably obtain in many jurisdictions where, to be an invitee, the per-
son must go upon the premises of another on the business of the other
or for their mutual benefit.' 4
The Lucas case-5 makes patently clear the fact that there is a con-
flict between the various jurisdictions as to the classification of a vis-
itor, and the duty owed by the occupier dependent upon that classifica-
8 Ibid. note 4 at page 398.
9 Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MiNN. L. REv. 573 at page 611
(1942). Cf. also The Outmoded Distinction. Between Licensees and Invitees,
22 Mo. L. REv. 195.
'0 Ibid. note 1.
156 Wash. 2d 136, 351 P. 2d 492 (1960).
12 Ibid. note 1.
13 Ibid. note 11 at page 493 of unofficial reports.
-4 See 65 C.J.S. 508.
15 Ibid. note 11.
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tion. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the current Wisconsin
position respecting this conflict.
In commencing this examination it appears appropriate to establish
the known situations which have resulted in a classification of either
licensee or invitee. This necessitates a review of the prior cases which
discussed this point and have applied Wisconsin law. From the two
Wisconsin cases previously referred to, Schlict v. Thesing'6 and Smith
v. Shuda,1 7 we know that an invitation coupled with a benefit of the
type rendered in these cases by a person not a member of the occu-
pier's immediate household is sufficient to constitute the person an
invitee. Conversely, although a social guest is invited, and although
the pleasure derived from the visit is certainly a benefit (even if not
in the commercial or business conception of advantage), the social
guest is a mere licensee. This has not been recently determined by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, but it is probable that this still is the law.
In Greenfield v. Miller,'s the plaintiff, a social guest at the home of
the defendant, slipped on a small rug on a highly polished floor and
injured her leg. The court commented that to be an invitee, and thereby
render the invitor liable for failure to exercise ordinary care, there
must be some benefit to the invitor. Plaintiff was held to be a licensee.
Also, as recently as 1959, in Cordula v. Dietrick,19 where a visiting
mother-in-law tripped over a garden hose lying across her son-in-law's
front walk, the court quoted with approval:
Thus all of the decisions are agreed that a social guest, however
cordially he may have been invited and urged to come, is not
in law an invitee, but is nothing more than a licensee, to whom
the possessor owes no duty of inspection and affirmative care to
make the premises safe for his visit.2
In Warner v. Lieberman,2" applying Wisconsin law, the plaintiff social
guest was also held to be a licensee. In this case the plaintiff was the
sister of the defendant and a gratuitous house guest. About two weeks
after commencing her visit, the plaintiff tripped over a defectively
fastened leg on a chaise lounge. The defendants were not held liable
for the injuries she sustained thereby. These decisions holding that
a social guest is a mere licensee are in accord with the unanimous
decisions of the other jurisdictions.22
Observable in all of the above cases is the common element of in-
16 Ibid. note 1.
17 Ibid. note 2.
18173 Wis. 184, 180 N.W. 834 (1921).
19 9 Wis. 2d 211, 101 N.W. 2d 126 (1959).20 1d. at page 212, 101 N.W. 2d 126 at page 127.
21253 F. 2d 99 (1958) ; from 154 F. Supp. 362.
22 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, Tentative Draft No. 5 at page 55 §330 subsection h(3)
• ..the decisions thus far have been unanimous to the effect that the social
guest is no more than a licensee."
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vitation. Also observable in each case is the presence of some benefit
to the occupier. However, the nature of the benefit varies. Is this, then,
the distinguishing factor? Probably not. By only slightly altering the
facts of any of the above cases, innumerable difficulties are presented.
For example, in the Warner case,23 where a social guest tripped over
the defective chaise lounge, suppose the plaintiff was initially invited
to babysit as in the Schlicht case,- but stayed on an extra day as a
mere visitor. Would the duty owed to her change correspondingly with
the change in her reason for being in the home of the defendant? Or
suppose Mrs. Schlicht was initially on the Thesing premises as a social
visitor and then, due to the importunate demands of that compendious
work which did in fact precipitate the need for plaintiff's visit, de-
fendant was forced to go to the hospital, and plaintiff to babysit with
the defendant's children. Would plaintiff then be any less vulnerable
to the dangers lurking behind the innocent-appearing basement door?
Would plaintiff's injury be not compensible one instant and compensible
the next? Consider also the case of an elderly in infirm woman who
regularly employs a companion. Would this elderly woman then be an
invitor of every dinner or social guest whom she invited in the com-
panion's absence? These hypotheticals, though seemingly specious, point
out the anomolous potentialities created by a rule of law making the
status of one invited onto the premises of another dependent on the
type of benefit enuring to the occupier, and compel a search for some
other possible distinguishing factor.
Some help may be found in dicta contained in Greefield v. Miller,
where the court, in discussing the determination of status, states:
It is difficult to lay down any general rule on the subject as ap-
plicable to all cases. The facts in each case, including the nature
of the invitation, must be considered. 26
This implies the need for an ad hoc determination in each case, and
points up the possible importance of the nature of the invitation. Con-
cern over the nature of the invitation is of course a restatement of the
"invitation" theory, basing the duty owed by an invitor on the implica-
tions of the invitation.2 7
On the basis of this statement, it would seem that the "nature of
the invitation," and the implication it carries with it, is an important
consideration. However, re-examining the Schlicht caseF how much
can be reasonably implied from the nature of the invitation? Is it not
23 Ibid. note 21.
24 Ibid. note 1.
25 Ibid. note 18.
26 Ibid. note 18 at page 189, 180 N.W. 834 at page 836.27 Refer to notes 8 and 9.
28 Ibid. note 1.
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somewhat presumptuous to assume that a husband or wife, after the
wife has begun her labor, goes about the home preparing to make it
safe for a babysitter? Or, in this situation, would the typical husband,
upon the arrival of the sitter, calmly discuss with the sitter the possible
dangerous conditions of the premises? The stronger implication, cer-
tainly, is that the invitation issues in circumstances of stress and
emergency, thereby imposing on the babysitter a greater duty of cir-
cumspection.
However, this is probably not the sense of the implication referred
to in the "invitation" theory. The implication is probably not intended
as a factual one, but as a question of legal imposition upon an occupier
who issues an invitation. This interpretation accords more smoothly
with the Wisconsin cases. In the case of a social guest, there would be
no implication of care being taken because there is no reason to im-
pose the higher duty of care on the invitor in this instance.29 But
where the occupier expects to receive a benefit from the visitor there
is, conversely, a reason for imposing a higher degree of care.
Remaining is the difficult problem presented when there is a change
in circumstance after the arrival; say from social guest to babysitter.
Relying on the implication of the invitation as construed on the basis
of the degree of care the invitor can reasonably be held to, liability
could be posited on either of two bases. Because of the benefit from
the babysitting services it would not be unreasonable in this case to
impose liability; and, in the alternative case where the visitor entered
for the purpose of conferring a benefit, it would not be unreasonable
to hold the occupier to a continuing maintenance of this same degree
of care, even though the status of the person was changed to that of
social guest. This would be in accord with the general trend of liability
extension.
30
What, then, is the current Wisconsin position? It is certain that
a social guest, although invited, is not owed the same duty of care as
is due to an invitee, even though in a sense there is a benefit to the
invitor in both cases. On the other hand, one need not be a conventional
business visitor to be an invitee. Nevertheless, it is likely that some
benefit circumstantially amounting to a financial gain or saving to the
29 The decided cases are in accord with the classification of a social guest as a
licensee. However, there is considerable support among legal writers for the
extension of the occupier's liability to social guests and for the abolition of
the distinction between the duty owed to an invitee and a licensee. See 1
Palloch Mo. L. REv. 45; 22 Mo. L. REv. 186; 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 599; and
Pallochi, Torts 697 (14th Ed., 1939).
30 See 95 A.L.R. 2d 992, 1016: "In the field of tort laws there is observable a
general trend towards the elimination of technical status positions which had
the effect of insulating certain classes from liability, the tendency being to




possessor will be required before the visitor will be held to be an in-
vitee. This is consistent with the logic inherent in the "invitation"
theory, and finds support in the fact that no Wisconsin cases have been
found where a person was held to be an invitee where some possibility
of such benefit was not present. As stated in the Greenfield case,31 the
court, in making its determination, will look to all the circumstances,
including the nature of the invitation and necessary implications to be
derived therefrom. JoHN P. FOLEY
Municipal Corporations: Burden of Persuasion Required in
Ordinance Violations: Defendant was found guilty of racing his
automobile in violation of.a city ordinance' which has a direct counter-
part in a criminal state statute.2 The circuit court reversed the con-
viction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain it.
When confronted with City of Madison v. Geier3 on appeal, the Wis-
consin Supreme Court, in a four-to-three decision, held that when a
violation of a municipal ordinance also constitutes a crime under state
law it must be proved by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence.
In coming to its conclusion the majority reviewed the three well-
accepted burdens of proof :4
(1) Mere preponderance.
(2) Clear, satisfactory and convincing.
(3) Beyond a reasonable doubt.5
The first two are applied to civil cases-the first to the ordinary civil
case and the second to those civil cases which involve fraud or criminal
offenses.' Observing that ordinance violations have long been held to
32 Ibid. note 18.
' Madison, Wis., Municipal Code §12.86.
2WIs. STAT. §346.94(2) (1963) providing: "Racing. No operator of a motor
vehicle shall participate in any race or speed or endurance contest upon any
highway."
'27 Wis. 2d 687, 135 N.W. 2d 761 (1965).
4 A precise definition of the two meanings of the phrase "burden of proof"
is found in Sellers v. Kincaid, 303 Ill. 216, 155 N.E. 429 (1922). In this civil
case, the clear distinction is made between (1) the duty of producing evi-
dence as the case progresses, and (2) the duty to establish the truth of the
claim by a preponderance of the evidence. One able writer, McCoRIlClC ON
EVIDENCE, §307 (1954), explains the former as the burden of producing evi-
dence and the latter as the burden of persuasion. See also 9 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE, §§2485-2489 (3rd ed. 1940).
5 The majority in the Geier case was therefore referring to the three measures
of the jury's persuasion designated by Wigmore, supra note 4, §§2497-2498, as
(1) mere preponderance, (2) clear, satisfactory and convincing, and (3)
beyond a reasonable doubt. See also McCormick, supra note 4, §§318-321.
6 Roberts v. Saukville Canning Co., 250 Wis. 112, 26 N.W. 2d 145 (1947);
Poertner v. Poertner, 66 Wis. 644, 29 N.W. 386 (1886) ; see also McCormick,
supra note 4, §320 and Wigmore, supra note 4, §2498. Clear satisfactory and
convincing evidence has been held to be required in those civil cases which
involve fraud, undue influence, a lost deed or will, a parol gift, an agreement
for adoption or to bequeath by will, mutual mistake sufficient to justify
reformation of an instrument, a parol or constructive trust, an oral contract
